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WHY JACK BALKIN IS DISGUSTING 
Andrew Koppelman* 
Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin didn’t win friends when he 
announced that (1) he is now a constitutional originalist and (2) 
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the 
right to abortion.1 His claim to membership in the originalist club 
brought forth a small army of eager bouncers, who were sure 
that originalism couldn’t possibly defend the paradigmatic 
departure from the Constitution’s original meaning.2 
Balkin has indeed posed a radical challenge to the vision of 
law that drives many originalists—more radical than he is willing 
to admit. His theory is in such deep tension with a commonly 
held vision of the rule of law that his argument is, to put the 
point precisely, disgusting. But that doesn’t mean that he is 
wrong. 
* * * 
Balkin argues that the best version of originalism is based, 
not upon the way in which the framing generation would have 
expected the text to be applied, but rather upon the public 
meaning of the text. The Fourteenth Amendment enacts 
principles of equal citizenship. Those principles are violated if 
 
 * John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, 
Northwestern University. Thanks to Jack Balkin, Shari Diamond, Peter DiCola, Eugene 
Kontorovich, Martha Nussbaum, Jim Pfander, Richard Posner, Richard Primus, Steven 
D. Smith, and Larry Solum for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 
(2007) [hereinafter Abortion and Original Meaning]; Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning 
and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007) [hereinafter 
Constitutional Redemption]. 
 2. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, That Old Time Originalism 11 (San Diego Legal 
Studies Paper No. 08-028, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1150447 (“Balkin’s acceptance of originalism may seem surprising, 
given his general tendencies and preferred conclusions: it is almost as if Christopher 
Hitchens were to announce that he has become a born again Christian.”). I have had 
conversations with many colleagues, both originalist and nonoriginalist, who are 
confident that Balkin has got to be kidding. 
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the state uses women’s capacity for pregnancy as a basis for 
assigning them a second class status or denying them liberty. 
Originalism, Balkin argues, is not inconsistent with the idea 
of a living constitution, because in practice the meaning of 
constitutional principles shifts over time. Some constitutional 
terms, such as “equal protection,” are intentionally abstract, 
leaving the specification to be worked out by later generations. 
Mobilized social movements, invoking their own interpretations 
of those texts, play a legitimate role in determining which 
specification will ultimately prevail.3 The constitutional 
protection of sex equality, for example, is the consequence of the 
feminist movement of the 1970s, which changed the mind of the 
public in a way that eventually was reflected in the interpretation 
of the Constitution.4 The triumph of gun rights in District of 
Columbia v. Heller5 is another example.6 
Some originalists have disputed Balkin’s specific argument 
about abortion, but that disagreement doesn’t explain the 
scandal that Balkin has provoked.7 The real issue is the 
suggestion that originalism is capacious enough to support this 
result. The idea that social movements shape constitutional law 
is particularly distressing to originalists, who are committed to 
the idea that the Constitution’s meaning does not shift over time. 
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport write, “it is a little 
difficult to see what is left of a recognizable originalism, not to 
mention the amendment process, if social movements have such 
substantial discretion to apply constitutional provisions as they 
see fit.”8 Steven Calabresi and Livia Fine claim that Balkin’s 
originalism “substitutes the rule of engaged social movements 
for the rule of law.”9 
 
 3. Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 1, at 305, 308–09; Constitutional 
Redemption, supra note 1, at 456–57, 491, 493–6, 504–11. 
 4. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 549, 574, 582 (2009). 
 5. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 6. Balkin, supra note 4, at 584. 
 7. My interest here is that scandal, not Balkin’s specific argument, which I won’t 
discuss further except to note that I’m sympathetic to the kind of move he is making. See 
Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor, Revisited: The Thirteenth Amendment and Abortion, 
in PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ABOLITIONISM AND ITS 
CONTEMPORARY VITALITY (Alexander Tsesis ed., forthcoming 2010); Andrew 
Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. 
REV. 480 (1990). 
 8. John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the 
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 381 (2007). 
 9. Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s 
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 687 (2009). 
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These charges draw blood only if there is a feasible 
alternative to the world contemplated by Balkin—an originalism 
that purges adjudication of discretion and the vagaries of 
political change. 
Balkin’s argument is both descriptive and normative. The 
descriptive part is an account of how constitutional 
interpretation is done in the United States—how constitutional 
interpreters in this culture make their way from the spectacularly 
vague commands of “equal protection” and “due process” to 
determinate legal outcomes. The normative part pronounces this 
process good. Like so many liberal legal theorists in the age of 
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, Balkin is a stodgy defender 
of the status quo. 
Putting it this way, however, understates the radicalism of 
his conservatism. His earlier writings imply that it is simply 
impossible for constitutional law to have the fixity and 
determinacy that his critics long for. Constitutional interpreters 
are condemned to be free.10 
* * * 
The giddy vertigo implicit in Balkin’s theory is made clearer 
in his earlier book, Cultural Software11—a book he has not so 
much as mentioned for several years now, for reasons we will 
consider shortly. Cultural Software ambitiously seeks to 
synthesize evolutionary biology, hermeneutics, semiotics, 
anthropology, psychology, linguistics, sociology, and many other 
disciplines into a unified theory of ideology. 
Following the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, 
Balkin argues that the basic units of thought are “memes,” 
contagious ideas, traditions, styles, and behaviors that manage to 
get themselves transmitted from one mind to another. 
Handshakes, melodies, clichés, styles of dress are all memes; 
they “encompass all the forms of cultural know-how that can be 
passed to others through . . . imitation and communication.”12 
These are combined, in a necessarily ad hoc and untidy way, into 
the “abilities, associations, heuristics, metaphors, narratives, and 
 
 10. The phrase “condemned to be free” is Sartre’s. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, 
BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 632 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956). Balkin’s affinity with 
existentialism is made clear in J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of 
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1629–30 (1990). 
 11. J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1998). 
 12. Id. at 43. 
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capacities that we employ in understanding and evaluating the 
social world.”13 
How is it that given memes manage to replicate themselves 
over time? Balkin suggests that there is no single answer to this 
question. The difference between a meme and a gene is that 
biologists have converged on a single account of what a gene is 
and how it replicates itself. Memes, on the other hand, replicate 
themselves in a bewildering variety of ways. The tune “Three 
Blind Mice” manages to perpetuate itself from one generation to 
the next; so does the practice of brushing teeth; but the 
mechanisms are different. 
Sometimes these heterogeneous mechanisms are mutually 
reinforcing. The persistence of racism is an example. Racism can 
be produced by “dissonance reduction among subordinate 
groups, by conceptual imperialism among dominant groups, by 
faulty inferences from prototypes and salient examples, by 
conceptual homologies that oppose blackness and whiteness, by 
suppression and projection of superior and inferior associations, 
by social scripts featuring stock characters and expectations 
about ethnic groups, and by recurrent cultural narratives about 
the American ‘savage war.’”14 These different cognitive tools are 
mutually reinforcing. “Ideological mechanisms are the result of 
bricolage and circumstance; their heterogeneity and disorder are 
the best evidence of their historical emergence.”15 Their effects 
can only be countered by criticism that uses other cognitive tools 
of the same kind, contingent mechanisms that have been thrown 
into our hands by historical circumstance. 
Balkin wants to evaluate ideological effects by their justice 
or injustice. Justice, he thinks, is a transcendent ideal, “an 
inchoate yearning that we attempt to articulate through our 
cultural constructions.”16 It “can never be perfectly realized,”17 
but it has an irresistible power just the same. It is puzzling how 
this transcendent aspiration can have the anchoring effect Balkin 
contemplates amid the world of flux that he describes.18 It 
appears to be necessary to take it as an object of practical faith. 
 
 13. Id. at 6. 
 14. Id. at 258. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 162. 
 17. Id. at 144. 
 18. He writes elsewhere that the sense of justice “is an inchoate, indeterminate and 
indefinite drive that acts as a goad rather than as a guide.” J.M. Balkin, Being Just With 
Deconstruction, 3 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 393, 402 (1994). 
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“[T]ranscendent ideals are presupposed by the rhetorical 
situation of having to persuade an audience. They seem to spring 
forth magically from the rhetorical encounter.”19 
But a judgment of justice or injustice does not help us 
understand the mechanisms by which ideological effects operate. 
Unlike earlier theorists such as Marx, Balkin assigns no distinct 
etiology to pernicious ideologies. Just and unjust forms of 
cultural knowledge perpetuate themselves through the same 
strategies. 
Balkin’s understanding of collective deliberation, David 
Charny observes, is 
a sort of war of all against all, a return to the state of nature, 
except that the warriors are not so much individuals as the 
memes that define individuals and that use them as vectors of 
propagation. The public space is not a collection of rational 
selves, but a swarm of viral particles of information.20 
The outcome of rhetorical contestation will necessarily be 
chaotic and unpredictable. A fortiori, this is true of 
constitutional contestation. What constrains constitutional law is 
not a set of rules, but a set of rhetorical norms, themselves 
unstable and shifting over time, that determine which moves are 
legitimate. Richard Posner has observed that “thinking like a 
lawyer” really means “an awareness of approximately how 
plastic law is at the frontiers—neither infinitely plastic . . . nor 
rigid and predetermined, as many laypersons think.”21 Balkin 
agrees, and emphasizes the way in which the boundaries shift as 
culture does, so that an argument regarded as crackpot and “off 
the wall” at one time becomes accepted doctrine later on.22 
 
 19. BALKIN, supra note 11, at 149. 
 20. David Charny, Farewell to an Idea? Ideology in Legal Theory, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
1596, 1614 (1999) (reviewing BALKIN, supra note 11). Charny continues: “What rescues 
this from utter bleakness is the (individually limited though collectively determinative) 
power of each self to influence memetic propagation, and the celebratory sense in which 
this diversity spawns ideals and aspirations that might elude a more tightly controlled 
communal discourse.” Id. This celebration of the proliferation of diverse cultural forms is 
also a central theme in Balkin’s approach to questions of free speech. See, e.g., Jack M. 
Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for 
the Information Society, 79 NYU L. REV. 1 (2004).  
 21. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 100 (1990). 
 22. Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 1, at 309; Constitutional 
Redemption, supra note 1, at 514; Framework Originalism, supra note 4, at 577, 584, 588, 
605. The bald fact of endorsement by powerful political actors can shift the boundaries of 
the crackpot, as when constitutional interpretations which “would have been regarded by 
most lawyers and judges as off the wall” became respectable when the Supreme Court 
endorsed them in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Jack M. Balkin, Idolatry and Faith: 
The Jurisprudence of Sanford Levinson, 38 TULSA L. REV. 553, 567–68 (2003) 
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* * * 
Balkin wrote in 1997, the year before Cultural Software 
appeared, that “[o]ur theories of the Constitution are makeshift 
attempts, reflecting the concerns of our era, but dressed up as 
timeless claims about interpretation.”23 The Constitution never 
really measures up to our transcendent ideal of justice. The turn 
to ideal constitutionalism, which identifies the Constitution with 
that transcendent ideal, is a way of coping with the cognitive 
dissonance this produces.24 But even our aspirations are 
historically conditioned. We can’t step out of our own skin. We 
can imagine redemption, but we are fated to live in a fallen 
world.25 
Balkin doesn’t talk like this any more. He’s now in the 
dressing-up business himself. This is clearest in his discussion of 
the question of the weight of precedent. 
[S]ocial movements sometimes succeed because they correctly 
see that the world has changed and that we must implement 
constitutional principles differently than we did before. When 
constitutional doctrine responds to their arguments, we 
should value these new decisions not because they are 
precedents, and not because social movements supported 
them, but because these decisions better implement 
constitutional text and principle in changing times.26 
 
[hereinafter Idolatry and Faith]. Any suspicion that Balkin himself regards legal 
argument as infinitely plastic is dispelled by his appalled reaction to that decision. See 
Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 
1407 (2001). 
 23. J.M. Balkin, Agreements With Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1719 (1997). 
 24. Id. at 1731. He is evidently influenced here by his former Texas colleague Philip 
Bobbitt, who likewise denies that there is any algorithm for constitutional interpretation, 
but defends the consequent indeterminacy on the basis that it “gives us a way to measure 
a possible legal world against our sense of rightness, going back and forth between a 
proposed interpretation and its world, and ourselves.” PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 158 (1991). Balkin frequently refers to Bobbitt’s 
modalities of constitutional law, which entail indeterminacy. See, e.g., Constitutional 
Redemption, supra note 1, at 483, 484, 485, 511. Robert Tsai’s important work has shown 
that constitutional law is even more indeterminate than Bobbitt allows, inasmuch as it 
has been significantly shaped by rhetorical moves that do not fit into any of Bobbitt’s 
modalities. See ROBERT TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON: CREATING A FIRST 
AMENDMENT CULTURE 31–32 (2008). 
 25. The implicit theology here is more Jewish than Christian: not only is the 
Messiah’s arrival endlessly deferred, he has never been here. 
 26. Constitutional Redemption, supra note 1, at 478. Smith observes that Balkin uses 
a bewildering variety of verbs to describe the relation between text and principle: 
“underlie,” “points to,” “embodies,” “presumes,” “adopt[s],” “enacts,” “endorses,” 
“employs,” is “connected to,” “attempt[s] to embrace.” Smith, supra note 2, at 11–12. 
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Precedents are to be judged against the text, but the text is a 
placeholder for our aspirations, which transcend any text. This is 
what “better” means in the sentence just quoted. Because our 
background assumptions and aspirations shift over time, the 
Constitution can no more have a stable meaning than anything 
else in the fluid world of cultural software. Balkin rejects “the 
idolatry of mathematical precision in legal reasoning.”27 The 
boundary that separates the plausible from the implausible 
is the boundary that distinguishes the Rule of Law from the 
arbitrary exercise of power. But if that boundary is not fixed, 
but moveable, and if that boundary can be moved through 
politics, or through the assertions of powerful people who 
seek to maintain their power, the certainty of our faith in law 
might well be shaken.28 
So in his recent constitutional writings, Balkin is gentle 
about delivering this bad news. I suspect that this is why, 
contrary to his own wry professional advice to legal academics to 
cite yourself whenever possible, he has hardly ever cited Cultural 
Software in his constitutional work, and a few years ago stopped 
doing so altogether.29 
This hasn’t kept his critics from feeling that Balkin has 
taken something precious from them. Orin Kerr declares that 
Balkin “attempts to eliminate the rhetorical power of originalist 
arguments by making essentially everything an originalist 
argument.”30 Ed Whelan, noting the “near-infinite malleability” 
of Balkin’s theory, argues that “a theory that can explain 
anything really explains nothing.”31 Matthew Franck writes that 
Balkin has “succeeded only in destroying everything about the 
edifice of originalism except the sign that hung on the building, 
which he picked up from the rubble and slapped on the construct 
 
 27. Idolatry and Faith, supra note 22, at 562. 
 28. Id. at 568. 
 29. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 843, 856–59 (1996). A Westlaw search of “au(balkin) & ‘cultural 
software’” in the JLR (journals and law reviews) database yielded four articles citing the 
book, the most recent from 2005. When asked about this reticence, Prof. Balkin 
responded: “There are many connections between Early Balkin and Later Balkin, but 
they are esoteric and none of them are particularly useful to readers.” Personal 
communication, June 25, 2009. Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain. 
 30. Orin Kerr, comment to Jack Balkin, Soul-Killer, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 11, 
2009, 8:40 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/08/jack-balkin-sou.html. 
 31. Ed Whelan, Reply to Balkin on Abortion and Original Meaning—Part 1, BENCH 
MEMOS, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Aug. 17, 2007, 1:34 PM), http://www. 
nationalreview.com/bench-memos/51395/reply-balkin-abortion-and-original-meaning-
mdash-part-1/ed-whelan. 
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hitherto known as the ‘living Constitution.’”32 Conversations 
with other constitutional scholars have shown me that these 
comments are only the tip of the iceberg. The sheer outrage that 
Balkin has provoked demands explanation. 
* * * 
The resistance to Balkin’s indeterminacy claim—a 
resistance he understands, which is why he’s so coy about the 
depth of the indeterminacy—operates in much the same way as 
the cognitive content of the emotion of disgust. Research in 
psychology, Martha Nussbaum reports, finds that disgust “has a 
complex cognitive content, which focuses on the idea of 
incorporation of a contaminant.”33 People will not eat food that 
has even briefly touched an unacceptable object, even if that 
object is harmless, such as a sterilized cockroach. “The 
ideational content of disgust is that the self will become base or 
contaminated by ingestion of the substance that is viewed as 
offensive.”34 The objects of disgust tend to focus on animals and 
animal waste products. “[T]he motivating idea has to do with our 
interest in policing the boundary between ourselves and 
nonhuman animals, or our own animality.”35 
The core objects of disgust are those that remind us of our 
animal vulnerability and mortality. This emotion appears to be 
an inevitable part of civilization, but, Nussbaum observes, it has 
a dangerous tendency to be associated with group subordination. 
“[T]hroughout history, certain disgust properties—sliminess, bad 
smell, stickiness, decay, foulness—have repeatedly and 
monotonously been associated with, indeed projected onto, 
groups by reference to whom privileged groups seek to define 
their superior human status. Jews, women, homosexuals, 
untouchables, lower-class people—all these are imagined as 
tainted by the dirt of the body.”36 Such projected disgust is 
contrasted with an ideal of the pure, hard, uncontaminated, 
 
 32. Matthew Franck, Jumping to Conclusions, BENCH MEMOS, NATIONAL REVIEW 
ONLINE (Aug. 18, 2007 4:58 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/51392/ 
jumping-conclusions/matthew-j-franck. 
 33. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND 
THE LAW 87 (2004) [hereinafter HIDING FROM HUMANITY]. See also MARTHA 
NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 200–06, 220–
22, 346–50 (2001).  
 34. HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 33, at 88. 
 35. Id. at 89. 
 36. Id. at 108. 
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impenetrable, invulnerable self—a dangerous delusion, precisely 
because it tends to produce such projections.37 
The hard impenetrable constitutional theory, one that is 
self-sufficient and not vulnerable to penetration by discretion 
and contingency, is a similar self-protective delusion.38 The 
continuing appeal of originalism when it presents itself as a 
program for radical transformation of judicial practice39 has 
become increasingly puzzling as it has become clear that it is as 
contingent and contestable as any of its rivals.40 The disgust that 
Balkin elicits offers an answer to the puzzle. 
Steven D. Smith, who understands the role of faith in 
constitutional theory better than most, laments that after Balkin, 
originalism is no longer available as a distinct approach to 
further (or at least attempt to further) the worthy 
purposes . . . for which it was devised—namely, constraining 
courts in history-grounded ways, and preserving the ability of 
democratic institutions to enact constitutional provisions with 
relatively definite and fixed meanings. That seems a 
regrettable loss (even for those who doubt originalism’s 
ability ultimately to provide what it promises).41 
Smith is nostalgic for that lost paradise, even though he 
knows that it never really existed. He flirts with (but cannot 
bring himself to surrender to) the bad faith of fundamentalism, 
which rejects modernity even though it is itself a product and 
reflection of modernity.42 
 
 37. Id. at 107–15. It would be delusional even if it did not produce these ideological 
effects, insofar as it rests on denial of one’s own mortality. See Cathy R. Cox, Jamie L. 
Goldenberg, Tom Pyszczynski & David Weise, Disgust, Creatureliness and the 
Accessibility of Death-Related Thoughts, 37 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 494 (2007). As it 
happens, disgust sensitivity is associated with conservative political attitudes. Yoel Inbar, 
David A. Pizarro & Paul Bloom, Conservatives Are More Easily Disgusted Than 
Liberals, 23 COGNITION & EMOTION 714 (2009); Yoel Inbar, David A. Pizarro, Joshua 
Knobe & Paul Bloom, Disgust Sensitivity Predicts Intuitive Disapproval of Gays, 9 
EMOTION 435 (2009). 
 38. Bobbitt observes that in Robert Bork’s shift from libertarianism to originalism, 
what persists is the “yearning to escape from mere politics to a decisive world of rules.” 
Bobbitt, supra note 24, at 102. 
 39. Some originalists disclaim any such ambition. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, 
Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244. 
 40. On the varieties of originalism, see Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living 
Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009). On the other hand, originalism is not infinitely 
plastic. It cannot support an argument that misrepresents its sources or conceals 
pertinent evidence. See Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment 
Clause, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2009). 
 41. Smith, supra note 2, at 15. 
 42. On the bad faith of fundamentalism, see PETER L. BERGER, THE HERETICAL 
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Balkin’s invocation of originalism simultaneously invokes 
and undermines that fixity and stability. “The tropes of fidelity 
to text and principle, and of their restoration and redemption in 
history are not simply fables we tell themselves,” he writes. 
“These tropes allow us to see the Constitution as a 
transgenerational project that connects different generations and 
identifies them as a single people stretched out over time.”43 This 
is like saying that God is not simply a fable because the idea of 
God allows the church to see itself as a single community. It 
doesn’t answer the question. The community would very much 
like to know whether the object of its faith is real. Eric Posner is 
right that Balkin is “trying to figure out what the PR angle of 
originalism is and how to duplicate it.”44 The problem is like the 
quandary of atheists who want to invoke religious language 
because it symbolically expresses human aspirations, even 
though whatever power the language has depends on the sense 
that God is a reality and not merely a metaphor.45 
Balkin isn’t merely faking it, because he thinks that the 
transcendent ideal of justice can endure any amount of 
deconstruction. “[E]ven the faithful, even the person who 
believes in God fervently and devotedly, knows that the works 
of religion, the products of religion, the practices and 
conventions of religion, are made by mortal human beings, by 
communities of belief that extend and evolve over time, 
sometimes over many centuries.”46 In the same way, even the 
person who firmly believes in the rule of law knows that it is 
made by fallible mortals. “So even the most devoted face the 
dangers inherent in faith, and they face them not because they 
are agnostic but precisely because they have given their lives 
over to faith.”47 The framers displayed their faith by codifying 
 
IMPERATIVE: CONTEMPORARY POSSIBILITIES OF RELIGIOUS AFFIRMATION 61–86 
(1979). 
 43. Constitutional Redemption, supra note 1, at 522. 
 44. Quoted in Ari Shapiro, Conservatives Have ‘Originalism’; Liberals Have...?, 
NPR ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (June 23, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=105439966&ps=cprs. 
 45. See Simon Blackburn, Religion and Respect, in PHILOSOPHERS WITHOUT 
GODS: MEDITATIONS ON ATHEISM AND THE SECULAR LIFE 179 (Louise M. Antony ed., 
2007). 
 46. Idolatry and Faith, supra note 22, at 558. 
 47. Id. Further evidence that doubt is not equivalent to faking it is provided by 
Pope Benedict XVI: 
[B]oth the believer and the unbeliever share, each in his own way, doubt and 
belief, if they do not hide from themselves and from the truth of their being. 
Neither can quite escape either doubt or belief; for the one, faith is present 
against doubt; for the other, through doubt and in the form of doubt. It is the 
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abstract ideals such as equal protection. When we today offer 
our best understanding of those ideals, we manifest the same 
faith. That is a kind of originalism. But it’s not the kind that 
conservative originalists were hoping for. 
Balkin thinks that faith is possible without endorsing 
implausible factual claims about the world. But human beings 
evidently vary in the degree to which they need to believe such 
claims in order to sustain their faith.48 The preacher may be 
vividly aware of the facts that make faith difficult, but that 
doesn’t obligate him to talk about them in every sermon. 
We live in a world in which the Constitution isn’t really a 
higher standard outside ourselves. It is a human construct, 
legitimated, if at all, by things unseen. We are, perhaps, all that 
the Constitution is constituted out of. Its innards are as slimy as 
ours. How disgusting is that? 
 
 
basic pattern of man’s destiny only to be allowed to find the finality of his 
existence in this unceasing rivalry between doubt and belief, temptation and 
certainty. Perhaps in precisely this way doubt, which saves both sides from being 
shut up in their own worlds, could become an avenue of communication. It 
prevents both from enjoying complete self-satisfaction; it opens up the believer 
to the doubter and the doubter to the believer; for one, it is his share in the fate 
of the unbeliever; for the other, the form in which belief remains nevertheless a 
challenge to him. 
JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY 46–47 (rev. ed. 
2004). 
 48. See Andrew Koppelman, Naked Strong Evaluation, 56 DISSENT 105 (Winter 
2009) (book review of CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007)). 
